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Abstract
In this paper, we propose an analysis of the French plural indefinite/definite (des/les) 
distinction in generic sentences. We argue that in existential and generic readings, (i) 
des is attached to a Maximality and a Novelty constraint, whereas (ii) les is attached to 
a Maximality and a Familiarity constraint. This allows us to capture the rule of use of 
des vs. un, but also to explain why the indefinite express analytic judgements, whereas 
the definite can express both analytic and synthetic judgements. Finally, we also 
account for their different tolerance to exceptions on a semantic basis.
Key-words: indefinite, definite, maximality, novelty, analyticity.
1. Introduction1
It is a well-known fact that the plural indefinite des  has very restricted 
conditions of use in generic readings (Corblin, 1987; Dobrovie-Sorin and Laca, 
1998; Dobrovie-Sorin and Mari, 2007a,b; Farkas and de Swart, 2007). The aim 
of this paper is to propose a new explanation of the difference between (i) (1a) 
and (1b) on one hand, and (ii) (1b) and (1c) on the other.
                                                
1 We thank the audiences of Going Romance 2008 and of the Séminaire Généricité of the 
Institut Jean Nicod. In particular, we are grateful to Anna Cardinaletti, Francis Corblin, Richard 
Kayne, Christopher Piñón and Gerhard Schaden. This research is supported by the Agence 
Nationale de la Recherche (ANR)  ANR-08-JCJC-0069-01 (Alda Mari) and the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 732, Project B5 (Fabienne Martin).
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(1) a. Un carré a quatre côtés.
A square has four sides. (generic singular indefinite)
b. *Des carrés ont quatre côtés.
’Des’ squares have four sides.(generic plural indefinite)
c. Les carrés ont quatre côtés.
’Les’ squares have four sides. (generic plural definite)
Three foundational questions for the theory of genericity are addressed in 
relation with the indefinite vs. definite distinction in generic sentences. Firstly, 
under the assumption that indefinites provide a variable to be bounded by the 
generic operator GEN in generic sentences (see Krifka et al., 1995), what kind 
of variables (if any) do plural indefinites provide? Secondly, can we explain 
why indefinite generic statements are analytic or definitional, as it is generally 
assumed? (cf. e.g. Burton-Roberts, 1977; Dahl, 1975; de Swart, 1996; Cohen, 
2001). Thirdly, how can we explain that des and les sentences have a different 
tolerance to exceptions?
The claim of this paper is threefold. Firstly, we argue that in their existential 
and generic readings, des and les both describe what we call "maximal sums".
On the one hand, des NPs provide a variable for maximal sums. We identify a 
“Maximality Constraint”, which, we argue, is attached to the generic des and 
is the translation in the generic domain of the “Non-Partitivity Constraint” 
(Martin, 2008) attached to the existential des. This claim about the generic des
goes against the hypothesis of  Kleiber, 2001 and Heyd, 2006 who argue that 
des implies a “partitive genericity”. On the other hand, les NPs directly denote 
maximal sums (de Swart and Farkas, 2007; see also Chierchia, 1998 and Dayal,
2004 who argue that definite plurals denote (intensional) plural kinds). 
Secondly, under their generic, les and des differ at the informational level as 
under their existential reading. After Heim, 1982, we assume two layers of 
Familiarity/Novelty: the referent and the description given by the NP can be 
either newly introduced in the discourse or already known at that point. We 
differentiate thus three different cases: (i) the referent is newly introduced by 
the NP and the description (property) that it provides is new too (the by default 
case with indefinites); (ii) the referent is familiar at the point of the assertion,
but the description (or “guise”) given by the NP is newly attributed to this 
(already familiar) referent (another possible case for indefinites); and (iii) the 
referent and the description provided by the NP are already familiar at the time 
of the assertion (which is the case characterizing the definite). However, we 
extend this analysis of Heim both to the non-generic and generic readings of 
(in)definites, which allows us to have a more uniform account of these 
determiners. Assuming a simple structure Det NP VP such that P and Q are 
respectively the properties denoted by the NP and the VP, we thus argue that on 
its generic and non-generic readings, les NP presupposes (i.) the existence of 
the referents and (ii) the guise P under which they are denoted (cf. Corblin, 
1987 about the non-generic les). On the other hand, the existential and generic
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des NP asserts or presupposes the existence of the entities, but invariably 
present the guise P as new (”Novelty Condition on the guise”). 
The third claim derives from the previous others. Les sentences simply give 
some properties P and Q that their referents satisfy. Des sentences provide the 
conditions for attributing the property P, namely, that of satisfying the property 
Q as well. Maximality is needed, since all elements of the class P without 
exception are concerned by the definition. The main result of the paper consists 
of providing a semantic account of the analytic (des) vs. descriptive (les) 
distinction, in a uniform account of existential and generic interpretation of des
and les.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces previous accounts of 
des indefinite generic; old and new data are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 
provides the new analysis and we conclude in Section 5.
2. Previous accounts
After all works considered below, we  assume in line with much research on 
semantics of plurals going back to Link, 1983 that individuals form an atomic 
join semi-lattice, with a sum operation, a part relation and a set of atoms. 
Interpretations, although not explicitly stated in all of these works, are 
established with respect to possible worlds.
2.1 Corblin, 1987
Corblin’s main point is that, whereas the singular indefinite un denotes in the 
set of atoms, des denotes both in the set of atoms and sums and is unspecified 
for number. A consequence of this view is that, whenever a des NP is in 
combination with a distributive predicate and should denote singularities, it is 
in concurrence with the singular indefinite. In this (default) case, the singular 
form is preferred. This suffices to explain why (1b) is ruled out and why, 
ceteris paribus, (2) is fine (one bus does not suffice to relieve the traffic). More 
generally, when an element of the context forces the generic des to denote sums 
(and not singularities), it acquires a legitimacy of use, since it is no longer in 
concurrence with the singular.
(2) Dans les villes, des bus soulagent le trafic.
In towns, ’des’ buses relieve the traffic.
The main problem of this account is that there exist many cases in which 
des can be used and which do not satisfy this requirement (cf. infra).
(3) a. Des hommes forts peuvent déplacer un piano.
’Des’ strong men can move a piano.
b. Des enfants mal élevés sont difficiles à tenir en place.
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’Des’ bad-mannered children are difficult to control.
c. Des lions ont une crinière.
’Des’ lions have a mane.
2.2 Dobrovie-Sorin and Mari, 2007
Dobrovie-Sorin and Mari (2007a, 2007b) push forward Corblin’s view that 
more than a singularity is needed to use des and consider the semantics of 
collectivity. Crucially, the authors subscribe to the difference between sums and
groups (à la Link, 1984 and Landman, 2000). From an ontological point of 
view, they argue that, on the one hand, sums are not objects and are related by a 
part-of relation, while on the other hand, groups are objects obtained by shifting 
a plurality into a plural atomic individual. Moreover, groups are atomic plural 
objects.
On their view, generic des can be used when the NP denotes a group and 
not a sum (contra eg. Corblin, 1987), because sums cannot be bound by GEN, 
since sums are not objects and quantifiers can only bind objects. Groups are 
objects and can therefore be bound by GEN. Consequently, in this case, GEN 
counts group-individuals. Sortal pluralized nouns (e.g. babies) denote sums 
whereas relational reciprocal nouns (e.g. brothers) denote groups. The 
following contrast is thus explained: since only groups can be bound by GEN, 
the quantificational statement cannot go through in (4c).
(4) a. Des jumeaux se ressemblent complètement.
’Des’ twins look totally alike.
b. GEN X (X is a group of twins) [X look totally alike]
c. ??Des bébés se ressemblent complètement.
’Des’ babies totally look alike. 
d. # GEN X (X is a sum of babies) [X look totally alike]
This first set of assumptions raises two problems. First, (2) is wrongly 
predicted to be unacceptable since buses denotes a sum. Second, (5) is wrongly 
predicted to be acceptable since brothers denotes a group.
(5) a. ??Des frères se ressemblent complètement.
’Des’ brothers completely look alike.
b. GEN X (X is group of brothers) [X look totally alike]
Secondly, the authors argue that des can be used in the presence of an NP
modifier introducing an event variable (like malade (sick) in (6a)). In this case, 
individuals are indirectly bounded to events via a Skolem function.
(6) a. Des enfants malades sont difficiles à gérer.
’Des’ sick children are difficult to deal with.
b. f GEN e [sick(e) & sick(f(e))] [difficult to deal with (f(e))]
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The major problem with this view is that non eventive NP modifiers like in 
(7) also meliorate the acceptability of des.
(7) Des hommes forts gèrent facilement la fatigue.
’Des’ strong men easily deal with tiredness.
Finally, there subsists a general shortcoming for Dobrovie-Sorin and 
Mari’s account, namely that they need to pose two different analysis for the 
generic and the existential reading (des in (8) cannot introduce a group since the 
predicate is distributive2).
(8) Durant l’excursion, des enfants étaient fatigués.
During the trip, ’des’ children were tired.
To conclude, the major problems with Dobrovie-Sorin and Mari’s view are 
that (i.) the generic des does not in fact provide a group variable and (ii) 
modification improves the acceptabilities for reasons other than introducing an 
event argument.
2.3 Farkas and de Swart, 2007
Farkas and de Swart (2007) argue that in Romance languages, definite and 
indefinite plurals are both able to express ’Maximality’. Maximality can be 
obtained with (i) reference to kinds and (ii) generic generalizations (see Krifka 
et al. 1995) by two different means: by summation (for plural kind reference
(i)) or generic (i.e. universal) quantification over individual-sized situations
(for generic generalizations (ii)).
As far as generic generalizations are concerned, Maximality is obtained by 
construction. GEN is a universal quantifier over situations, hence, in (9), all 
(possible) dogs are concerned by the generalization. In English, bare plurals are 
considered to be able to have a kind reading and to support generic 
generalizations. In French, both the plural indefinite and definite can be used in 
generic generalizations. Note that in (9b), the situation variable is introduced by 
the stage level predicate hungry.
(9) a. Hungry dogs are dangerous.
b. Des/Les chiens affamés sont dangereux.
c. GEN s((xDog(x, s)  Plural(x)  Hungry(x, s)), Dangerous(x, s))
                                                
2From a semantic point of view, they consider much in the line of the literature that sums are in 
the denotation of distributive predicates (The boys wear green socks), whereas groups are in the 
denotation of collective predicates (The boys gather at 6pm).
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Under the kind reading, Maximality can be obtained in virtue of the 
meaning of the definite which is associated with the maximal sum of an 
intensional lattice. In French, the plural definite must be used, the indefinite 
being out.
(10) a. Dinosaurs are rare.
b. Les/*Des dinosaures sont rares.
’Les’ dinosaurs are rare.
c. !KK = Σx,w(Dinosaur(x,w)  Plural(K)  rare(K))
As said above, the plural indefinite in French has been described as having 
a very restricted use, namely the one illustrated in (9). The authors explain this 
preference for the definite plural by the fact that the languages at hand (eg 
French) satisfy a ’High Maximality’ and hence prefer the definite, differently 
from languages like English which satisfy ’High Familiarity’ and prefer 
existential genericity.
(11) a. *The/Dinosaurs are extinct.
b. Les/*Des dinosaures sont en voie d’extinction.
However, Farkas and de Swart’s account cannot cover all data, since, as 
already noticed above, non-eventive modifiers can also be used in des sentences 
(7) (the presence of the situation variable is then unjustified). Moreover, des is 
even possible without NP modifiers. And crucially, des sentences have a 
different interpretation of les sentences with which they are not in concurrence 
(see next section), which is not captured by this account. However, we will 
adopt their claim that the generic des is associated with Maximality. But we 
argue that this property is encoded in the meaning of the determiner both in its 
existential and generic readings.
3 New (and old) data: discussion
3.1 Old data and recent accounts
It has been repeatedly noted that indefinite generics express definitional 
statements or analytic truths (see eg Burton-Roberts, 1977; Dahl, 1975; de 
Swart, 1996; Greenberg, 2001), differently from bare plurals and plural 
definites in French, which are considered to express accidental or descriptive 
generalizations. In (12), since ‘popular’ is not a ’definitory’ property of 
madrigals, it is only compatible with bare plurals (plural definites in French).
(12) a. A dog has four legs. / Un chien a quatre pattes.
b. #A madrigal is popular. / *Un madrigal est populaire.
c. Madrigals are popular. / Les madrigaux sont populaires.
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What has not been observed for French though is that differently from les, 
des cannot be used when a causal relation between P and Q lacks.
(13) a. Les enfants de cette classe/ de cet âge sont bruyants.
’Les’ children of this class/of this age are noisy.
b. Des enfants #de cette classe/ OK de cet âge sont bruyants.
’Des’ children of this class/ of this age are noisy.
Different accounts have been proposed to capture the precise causal 
relation that indefinite generic sentences express. Greenberg, 2002 argues that 
both indefinite and definite generic sentences express causal relations between 
the property P and Q, but that the ones conveyed by indefinite generic 
sentences express are ‘tighter’ than in definite generic sentences (considered to 
express accidental generalizations3). She argues that these sentences differ by 
the types of accessibility relations among worlds (Kratzer, 1991): in indefinite 
generic sentences (IS sentences), an ’in virtue of’ property (S) is accommodated 
between property P and Q, causally related to P. In definite generic sentences
(BE sentences), the accessibility relation amounts to maximal similarity4.
(14) A boy (P) does not cry (Q), interpreted as: In every possible world, 
if an individual is a boy, then it is tough (S), then he does not cry.
(15) Madrigals are popular, interpreted as: In all worlds maximally 
similar to ours, if something is a madrigal, it is popular.
Greenberg recognizes that IS and BE sentences are sensitive to different 
kinds of exceptional individuals; in particular, she shows that IS sentences are 
less flexible for what counts as an exceptional individual (see Greenberg, 2007 
for details) and explains this difference via the two different causal relations 
involved in the interpretations5. 
It seems to us that the author does not explain why indefinite generics 
express causal relation that more intrinsically relates property P to property Q, 
while definite generics are preferred for expressing an accidental causal 
relation. Moreover, the unified causal analysis proposed flats out the 
peculiarities of the bare plural/indefinite distinction. 
We claim instead that the lexical meanings of the indefinite and the definite 
crucially matter in the interpretation of generic sentences. More precisely, we 
are going to argue in the following sections that the correlation between the 
kind of determiner chosen and the type of relation expressed is due to the 
                                                
3It has to be noted that Greenberg provides a causal account even for the notion of accidentality. 
4 This view has been challenged by Mari (2008a, 2008b) who argues that, for indefinite 
generics, the modality is essentially epistemic.
5 As we state in note 5, des plural generic indefinite does not support exceptional individuals, 
while the singular indefinite generic sometimes does. It is part of the endeavor of this paper to 
explain why des does not tolerate exceptions. 
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meanings that the determiners have in both their existential and generic 
interpretations. Before developing this idea, we present and discuss additional 
data.
3.2 More data on causality
3.2.1 Modification, focus and question-answer pairs
Heyd, 2006 claims that aside from eventive modifiers, non-relational adjectives 
can rescue the acceptability of des. For instance, relational adjectives like 
d’Afrique (from Africa) are supposed not to be able to perform the job of 
malade or fort in (6) and (7). The acceptability is from Heyd (ibid.):
(16) *Des éléphants d’Afrique sont lents.
’Des’ African elephants move slowly.
We do not agree with this empirical generalization: it seems to us that any 
adjective, including relational ones, makes the generic statement acceptable as 
far as the sentence has a specific prosodic structure, illustrated below (the 
vowel of the syllables bearing raising accent is written in bold), and that a 
certain causal relation (defined further Section 4.1.2) can take place between 
the nominal and verbal predications.
(17) Des éléphants d’Afríque sont lénts
’Des’ African elephants are slow.
Importantly here, the first topic is not contrastive. For instance, the 
example above is unacceptable in the following discourse.
(18) A. Quels éléphants sont lents?
B.*Des éléphants d’ Afríque sont lents.
A.Which elephants move slowly?
B.’Des’ African elephants move slowly.
According to our hypothesis, it is precisely the double raising accent we 
have in (17) which introduces the causal relation needed to render the example 
acceptable. This also holds in absence of any adjective, for instance in the 
square example:
(19) Des carrés ont quatre côtés.
’Des’ squares have four sides.
Sometimes, the causal relation is so obviously interpreted between the two 
predicates that the double-accent is not needed to trigger it. For instance, in (6a) 
repeated below as (20), a causal relation between being sick and being difficult 
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to deal with is automatically interpreted, without the help of the prosodic 
structure in the examples above.
(20) a. Des enfants malades sont difficiles à gérer.
’Des’ sick children are difficult to deal with.
The double-accent is also optional in question-answer contexts that trigger 
by themselves the needed causal relation between the definitory properties P
and Q.
(21) A: Comment c’est un éléphant d’Afrique? 
How is it an African elephant?
B: Des éléphants d’Afrique sont lents. 
’Des’ African elephants move slowly.
3.2.2 A related issue: prescriptive statements
Des sentences have been described as having a prescriptive use (eg. Dahl, 1975, 
Carlier, 1989). For instance, according to us, (22) is typically uttered in front of 
plants that are not being treated as such by a speaker who wants her hearer to
water them.
(22) Des plantes ont besoin d’eau pour vivre! (Corblin, 1987)
’Des’ plants need water to live !
3.3 Sensitivity to exceptions
Besides intensional differences, des and les statements also differ in their 
sensitivity to exceptions6.
3.3.1 Sauf (all but)
Contrary to des statements, les ones can be followed by sauf (all but ...), while 
des statements cannot.
(24) a. Les professeurs dans cette université portent une cravate sauf Jean.
’Les’ professors in this university wear a tie, except John.
b. Dans cette université, des professeurs portent une cravate, #sauf Jean.
’Des’ professors in this university wear a tie, except John.
                                                
6 Note that for French, the situation is a bit more complex than in English. While as we will see, 
the generic des is systematically intolerant to exceptions, its singular counterpart un is 
sometimes acceptable with exceptions, like the English a (see for English Greenberg, 2007). For 
instance, Dans cette bibliothèque, un livre peut s’emprunter pour 5 jours, sauf ceux-ci ‘In this 
library, a book can be borrowed for 5 days, except these ones’ is fine, while ??Une jeune fille 
bien élevée parle français, sauf Marie ‘A well behaved young lady speaks French, except 
Marie’ is odd.
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In a similar vein, B’s reply has a different effect in (25) and (26). After a 
les statement, it signals that there are some exceptions (the statement of A is 
only corrected). After a des statement, it invalidates the rule as a whole (the 
statement of A is rejected).
(25) A. Les professeurs dans cette université portent une cravate.
’Les’ professors in this university wear a tie.
B. Mais non, regarde Pierre, il ne la porte pas.
No, look at Pierre, he does not wear one !
(26) A. Dans cette université, des professeurs portent une cravate.
’Des’ professors in this university wear a tie.
B. Mais non, regarde Pierre, il ne la porte pas.
No, look at Pierre, he does not wear one !
3.3.2 En général (in general)
The adverb en général has two different interpretations in des and les
statements.7
(26) a. Qui sait faire une règle de trois?
Who is able to make a rule of three?
b. Des/Les mathématiciens (en général).
’Des’/’Les’ mathematicians (in general).
The les sentence means that the majority of mathematicians is able to solve 
a rule of three. The des sentence means that the majority of people able to make
a rule of three are mathematician (Note that it again shows that des N forbids to 
take a sample of N out of the set of N). En général triggers a ’in majority’ 
reading with les, but has an intensional interpretation with des8.
4. Ingredients of ‘des’
In this section, we present our own analysis, discussing two features of des: 
Maximality and Novelty. We contrast these two ingredients of des with les, 
which is also associated with Maximality (cf. de Swart and Farkas, 2007), but 
presents a Familiarity feature, exactly as under its non-generic reading. We 
                                                
7 Note that the generic des is unacceptable with en majorité (*Des enfants de cet âge sont en 
majorité bruyants, ‘des children of this age are in majority noisy’), but this is not due to the 
intolerance of des to exceptions, but rather to the fact that des is incompatible with any floating 
quantifier, including tous (*Des enfants de cet âge sont tous bruyants, ‘des children of this age 
are all  noisy’). Thanks to Gerhard Schaden and Francis Corblin for this point.
8For a related discussion in the ‘intensional’ and ‘extensional’ uses of frequency adverbs, see 
Mari (2008a, 2008b).
MARI                                                             11
show how these two combinations lead to the intended interpretation, derive the 
analytical vs. synthetic distinction and explain the data presented.
4.1 The Non-Partitivity Constraint attached to ‘des’
4.1.1 The Non-Partitivity Constraint in existential sentences
Contra a general view according to which des signals partitivity (see eg Kleiber, 
2001), and following an intuition of Attal, 1976, Martin, 2008 argues that des, 
on its existential reading, is specified for Non-Partitivity. Accordingly, we 
assume that des is the plural of un and not of the partitive du9. More precisely, 
she argues that contrary to eg quelques, the existential des is unacceptable 
when the context forces to contrast the set X it refers to with a non-empty 
complement set X’ in a contextual superset EA (A being the set denoted by the 
noun). Her empirical arguments are among others the following. Firstly, as 
observed by Attal, a discourse like (27a) is unacceptable with des. Secondly, 
(27b) may be continued with a sentence beginning with les autres ('the others'), 
while this would not be felicitous in (27c).
(27) a. J’ai cueilli quelques/*des fleurs, mais pas toutes.
I picked ’des’ flowers, but not all.
b. Quelques enfants jouent dans la rue.
’Quelques’ children are playing in the street. (OK in a context where 
members of X are contrasted with the other children in the context)
c. Des enfants jouent dans la rue.
’Des’ children ... (# in the same context)
4.1.2 The Non-Partitivity Constraint in generic sentences
We claim that the Non-Partitivity Constraint also holds for the generic reading 
of des, in the sense that des generic sentences are acceptable only when they 
express properties that hold for all members of the class without exception, and 
not only parts of them. To describe this fact, we propose that des expresses 
Maximality in generic statements. In other words, under both existential/ 
generic readings, des forbids to refer to a sample of A in a superset of A. 
How this property relates to the data above? With regard to causality, 
Maximality is needed for the causal relation at hand between P and Q. Indeed,
this causal relation relates a definitory property of the P’s elements, in the sense 
                                                
9The debate about the semantics of des is very old in the grammatical tradition of French and 
Port Royal grammarians were already divided on this issue. One of the major arguments in 
favour of the view that des is the plural of du is essentially morphological. French admits NPs 
as de nombreux amis (‘de’ numerous friends), which favours the decomposition of des in 
de+les. However, it has been recently shown for Northern Italian dialects that the equivalent 
Italian of ‘des’, ie dei (de + i) is not allowed to loose the ‘i’ in contexts where it is undoubtly a 
preposition. It is allowed though in contexts in which it is used as a determiner (Anna 
Cardinaletti, 2008). For further semantic arguments in the recent debate see also Le Bruyn, 
2007 for a position similar to ours according to which des is the plural of un. 
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that an entity should  necessarily satisfy Q to be included in the set P. Thus, all 
P elements are concerned. (Note that we have not explained yet where causality 
comes from, but only that it relates to a specific feature of the indefinite des, 
that is to say, Maximality is need for the causal relation at hand). 
It is crucial to note that des generic statements are not compatible with 
discourses and expressions that involve the existence of exceptions, precisely 
because the causal relation at hand does not tolerate it. As  it does not tolerate 
exceptions contrary to the generic les, the generic des is unacceptable with 
adverbials like en majorité (in majority). 
(28) # Des (OK les) enfants malades sont en majorité difficiles à gérer.
’Des’(OK the) sick children are in majority difficult to deal with.
However, more needs to be said to capture the difference between des and 
les, since the generic les is also associated with Maximality (Farkas and de 
Swart, 2007). Why les is not associated with the same causal relation? 
4.2 Differences between the generic ‘des’ and ‘les’: the Familiarity condition
Under its non generic reading, les requires (i) presupposition of existence of the 
entities it denotes (in a certain world), and (ii) that the property P provided by N
is already known at the time of assertion t0 (point (ii) differentiates les from the 
demonstrative ces, cf. Corblin, 1987), while Q is new at that time.
(29) a. Jean ne voulait pas se coucher sur le sol. *Le/OK Ce lit était trop 
dur. (Corblin, 1987)
John didn’t want to lie on the floor. The/this bed was too hard.
Des behaves differently. It is indifferent to the first requirement (the 
existence of the entities can be presupposed or not). However, the property P is 
invariably presented as new at the time of assertion t0, the referent being already 
introduced or not in t0. This is obvious under the existential reading, because as 
the referent is newly introduced in t0, the property attributed to this referent 
must be new in t0 too:
(30) Des lapins couraient dans le jardin.
’Des’ rabbits were running in the garden.
However, the Novelty Condition also holds on the property in the generic 
sentences, although here, it is possible that the existence of the denoted entity is 
in a way presupposed in the discourse in t0. See again the mathematician 
example (31).
(31) A. Qui sait faire une règle de trois?
B. Les/des mathématiciens.
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A. Who can make a rule of three?
B. ’Les’/’Des’ mathematicians.
In the les sentence, the speaker speaks of people of which it is already 
assumed at t0 that they are mathematicians. On the contrary, in the des sentence, 
the speaker does as if it ’baptized’ every entity which is able to make a rule of 
three with the property of being a mathematician (The property of being a 
mathematician is newly attributed to the entities in t0).
In a similar vein, consider the examples in (32)-(33). The oddity of les in 
(32b) and (33b) is due to the fact that les should refer to entities whose 
existence is presupposed, and of which it is taken for granted in t0 that they are 
talking dogs. On the other hand, (33a) is perfect because it does not presuppose 
the existence of talking dogs. Similarly, (32a) can be uttered in front of some 
elements whose existence is presupposed in the discourse. However, the status 
of being ’dogs who talk’ is part of the assertion, and thus easier to present as 
challengeable. In other words, although the existence of some entities can be 
presupposed in t0, their introduction in the discourse under the guise P is 
however invariably new.10
(32) a. Des chiens qui parlent se remarquent très vite.
’Des’ dogs who talk would be very quickly noticed.
b. #Les chiens qui parlent se remarquent très vite.
The dogs who talk would be very quickly noticed.
(33) a. Imaginons des chiens qui parlent.11
Let us imagine ‘des’ dogs who talk.
b. #Imaginons les chiens qui parlent.
Let us imagine ‘les’ dogs who talk.
4.3 Towards a new analysis
We conclude from the discussion above that, des and les have three distinctive 
features.
1. (i) Under its generic and non generic reading, les NP presupposes in t0 (a) the 
existence of P elements (b) the guise P under which these elements are 
described. (ii) Under its both readings, des NP (a) presuppose or asserts the 
existence of xs in t0 but (b) automatically presents the guise P as newly 
attributed to xs in t0. 2. (i) In les generic statements, the (familiar) property P is 
                                                
10 The contrast between Jean fume des cigares ‘Jean smokes des cigars’ and #Jean fume les 
cigares ‘Jean smokes les cigars’ is of the same nature (thanks again to F. Corblin for these 
examples), where les rigidly designates cigars. It has to be noted, however, that des has a 
restricted use in object position, in generic sentences. *Jean nourrit des chiens (existential only) 
‘Jean feeds dogs’ vs. Jean élève des chiens (generic interpretation) ‘John raises dogs’. 
Specifically, it seems that the generic interpretation can be obtained only in cases of 
incorporation (as the corresponding Italian bare plural in object position). 
11 Thanks to Francis Corblin for this example.
MARI                                                             14
attributed independently of the (new) property Q. (ii) In des generic statements, 
property P is attributed iff property Q is attributed as well. 3. (i) Les sentences 
describe a generalization, namely that the xs that belong to P also (in majority) 
belong to Q (’bottom up generalization’). (ii) Des sentences prescribe a 
generalization, namely that if x belongs to P, then it also belongs to Q (’top 
down generalization’). To further illustrate the proposal, let us come back to the 
mathematicians example:
(34) a. Qui sait faire une règle de trois ?
Who is able to make a rule of three?
b. Des/Les mathématiciens (’Des’/’Les’ mathematicians.)
In the les answer, one presupposes that individuals who are mathematicians 
exist and keep track of the fact that they are able to make a rule of three. With 
the des answer, one asserts that, if individuals are to be described as 
mathematicians, they must be able to make a rule of three.
4.4 Explaining the facts
4.4.1 Analyticity, causality and informational structure
Analyticity typically does not require the actual existence of members of the 
class. Des sentences provide a ’rule’(see also Cohen, 2001; Greenberg, 2002; 
Mari, 2008b for recent accounts). Why? Our answer is that this is due to the 
different informational structure attached to the definite vs. the indefinite. The 
definite sentences presuppose the attribution of the property P and newly 
introduce the property Q. Precisely because of this difference in the givenness 
of the attribution of P and Q, the attribution of Q cannot depend on the one of 
P. Thus, the causal relation characterizing des sentences is not verified by les
ones, although both des and les are associated with Maximality. On the other 
hand, the indefinite sentences do not presuppose the attribution of the property 
P: properties P and Q are both asserted. Thus, satisfying Q can be the criterion 
for attributing P.
The indefinite sentence thus provides a criterion for attributing the property 
P, namely satisfying the property Q. Les sentences take for granted the 
existence of their referents and of their nominal guise. Hence they are suitable 
in descriptions of fragments of reality and express descriptive generalizations. 
On the contrary, des sentences are about the conditions for attributing the 
nominal property P. They provide a law which rules the membership to the set 
of P (namely, in order to be a P, one has to be a Q) and they are also acceptable 
in a context where the set of P is empty. In other words, indefinite statements 
turn out to be about the conditions for attributing property P. Consequently, in 
generic statements that hold independently of particular circumstances, they can 
only express definitions or causal relations which hold in all possible worlds.
MARI                                                             15
4.4.2 Tolerance to exceptions
The explanation as for why les is more tolerant to exceptions than des also 
derives from the informational properties of des-les, which turn out to express 
two different kinds of Maximality. Des NP does not presuppose that the xs in 
the discourse are P-elements. However, if they are, they must be in Q as well. 
Since les NP presupposes the existence of P-elements without them being Q
elements, it tolerates that there might well be P elements which are not Q 
elements.
4.4.3 Incompatibility with kind referring VPs
If plural indefinites  refer to maximal sums (like definites), why cannot they be 
combined with kind denoting predicates? Our answer is that these predicates 
are not able to provide a criterion to classify elements as P (they are 
’intrinsically descriptive’ predicates). For instance, être en voie d’extinction 
(‘become extinct’) does not provide a property that a dog must have in order to 
be categorized as a dog. As the definite version does not present the property Q 
as a condition to be classified among the set P, the problem does not arise.
Similarly, ne pas exister (not to exist) is incompatible with des because it 
cannot provide a law ruling the membership to the set of unicorns, cf. (36).
(35) *Des chiens sont en voie d’extinction.
’Des’ dogs are extinct.
(36)* Des/OK les licornes n’existent pas.
‘Des’ unicorns do not exist.
4.4.4 Prescriptive use
The prescriptive use often attributed to des sentences can also be easily 
explained:
(37) Des plantes ont besoin d’eau pour vivre! (Corblin, 1987)
’Des’ plants need water to live !
The fact that des sentences provide a rule commanding the membership to the 
set of P is at the root of their performative uses. They can function as threats: 
“if you don’t water these things, don’t pretend anymore that they qualify as 
plants!”; blessings: “if you can do a rule of three, I call you a mathematician!”; 
commands: “if you want to be a true Bruxellois, learn Flemish!” and so on. 
Moreover, the fact that des sentences must function as rules of this type explain 
why adverbs like par définition (by definition) or dignes de ce nom (worth of 
this name) always meliorate their acceptability (also Mari, 2008b): *Des petits 
chats miaulent (’Des’ little cats meouw) vs. Des petits chats dignes de ce nom 
miaulent (’Des’ little cats worthy of this name meow).
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed an analysis for the generic reading on indefinite 
plural sentences in contrast with the singular indefinite and the plural definite. 
We have argued that des has two features in both its existential and generic 
reading.: (I) Non Partitivity constraint or Maximality – we have argued that des
denotes maximal contextual sums – ; (ii) Novelty condition – we have argued 
that differently from definites, indefinites require that the guise of their 
referents must be presented as new. This hypothesis allowed us to explain why 
indefinites are preferred for expressing analytical statements, are more 
intolerant to exceptions, as well as a series of previously unexplained data. One 
important result of this account is that we are not obliged anymore to postulate 
the existence of two different les or des (generic and non-generic). For the 
definite, one argument in favor of this view is that its distribution is clearly 
different from the generic le, because the former always presuppose the 
existence of the instantiations of the kind, while the latter not. For instance, 
while (38a) does not raise any pragmatic problem, nobody would assume (38b), 
cf. Corblin, 1987.
(38) a. Au Moyen-Age, l’enfant n’existe pas. (Corblin, 1987)
In the Middle-Age, ‘le’ child does not exist.
b. #Au Moyen-Age, les enfants n’existent pas. (id.)
In the Middle-Age, ‘les’ children do not exist.
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